Introduction
In the fight against terrorism States have resorted to a variety of weapons. Much attention has been devoted to criminal law as a possible answer to terrorism 1 . Many States have also resorted to nationality law, using deprivation as a means to punish those involved in terrorism 2 . In some countries, this has given rise to important rulings, such as those of the English Supreme Court in the Al Jedda and Minh Quang Pham cases. 3 In Australia a new provision expands the government's power to revoke Australian citizenship for those found to have engaged in terrorist conduct. In yet other countries, work is under way to sharpen the existing legislation and broaden the possibility to deprive citizens of their nationality 4 . This paper will focus on Belgium and France. These two countries indeed present striking similarities. Both in France and Belgium the provisions on deprivation already made it possible to deprive a national of his citizenship in terrorist cases. Nevertheless, the legislation in these countries has been recently modified to offer yet a stronger answer to terrorism. The public debate in the two countries is modeled on similar lines. This is in particular true for the issue of equality arising in connection of deprivation of nationality. The paper will first offer an overview of the existing statutory provisions in the two countries (II), before critically reviewing the discussion on equality and non discrimination (III).
II

Deprivation of citizenship in Belgium and France
Belgium
Deprivation of nationality has been a standard feature of the law on Belgian citizenship since the early 1900's. As early as 1919, Belgian law made it possible to deprive of its nationality persons who had become Belgian citizens during the first World War
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This provision was only rarely applied 7 . This made it difficult to have a clear view of its scope. It would not, however, have been unreasonable to apply it in case of terrorism 8 . This could be inferred from the attitude adopted by the executive in 1996 following the conviction of two persons for terrorist acts associated with the GIA, active in Algeria. Although these two persons had been found guilty of terrorist crimes, the Minister of Justice declined to seek deprivation of their nationality. The Minister argued that Article 23 should be strictly interpreted and that the two persons had merely provided logistic help to the members of GIA. As the latter was not directly threatening the security of Belgium, but rather that of foreign States, there was, according to the Minister, no reason to seek the deprivation 9 . One may infer from this reasoning that if terrorists seek to create panic in Belgium, deprivation would be in order.
This was further confirmed in 2004 : following another highly publicized case of terrorism, the Minister of Justice indicated that whether or not deprivation proceedings would be introduced following a criminal conviction would first depend on the question whether the individual possessed another nationality, as the minister was concerned to avoid statelessness. Further, the minister also indicated that deprivation would be balanced against the risk that the individual would no longer be registered as a citizen, which would make it more difficult to trace him. These answers confirmed in any case that convictions for terrorist acts could lead to deprivation 10 .
In 2009 the Court of Appeal of Brussels confirmed this view : it deprived a Tunisian-Belgian citizen of its Belgian citizenship following a series of conviction for various terrorist offenses 11 . It appeared that the individual had been instrumental in recruiting various persons and convince them to fight in Tunisia and Afghanistan. The same interpretation was adopted in later cases 12 .
Starting in 2012, the provision attracted renewed attention 13 . In a series of rapid changes, the legal , the Act also strengthened the provision on deprivation : a new Article 23/1 was introduced, which made it possible to deprive a person of its Belgian citizenship in case this person is found guilty of a terrorist crime and sentenced to at least five years of jail 15 . Deprivation was linked to the specific terrorist offenses listed in the Criminal Code. Certain offenses were, however, excluded. Persons convicted for having recruited other in order to commit a terrorist crime (art. 140ter), or to have provided training instruction in relation to the use of weapons (art. 140quater) could not be deprived of their nationality. Likewise, a conviction for spreading publicly a message inviting to commit terrorist offenses (art. 140bis), would not lead to deprivation.
As was the case with the previous provision, the possibility to deprive somebody of its nationality was limited in time. It could only take place provided the person concerned had acquired its Belgian citizenship less than ten year before the terrorist acts were committed 16 . Contrary to the previous regime, deprivation was no longer the monopoly of the Court of Appeal : under Article 23, deprivation has to be request before the Court of Appeal. Under Article 23/1, deprivation may be requested before any court. The rationale is to allow the criminal court to rule on deprivation after having found somebody guilty.
Following the attack of Charlie Hebdo in Paris, the government announced its intention to sharpen the possibility of deprivation 17 . A bill was introduced in June 2015, which suggested to create a new provision entirely dedicated to the deprivation of nationality on ground of terrorism 18 . The bill was adopted in July 2015 19 . A new Article 23/2 was therefore introduced in the Code. This provision made it possible to deprive citizens of their nationality if convicted for any terrorist offense to more than five years of jail. The scope of the deprivation was therefore broadened to include new terrorist offenses 20 . Another novelty concerned the temporal scope : unlike the previous regime, the new deprivation mechanism could be applied no matter how long the person concerned has possessed the Belgian citizenship. In other words, no limitation applied in time. As with the regime introduced in 2012, the deprivation could be imposed by any court and not only by the Court of Appeal. 
Deprivation of Belgian citizenship -an overview
France
France has already introduced the possibility to deprive a citizen of its nationality as a counterterrorism tool in 1996. At that time, provision was added to the Civil Code, according to which a person may be deprived of its French citizenship if found guilty of a crime "characterized as an ordinary or serious offense that constitutes a violation of the fundamental interests of the Nation, or for a crime or offense that constitutes an act of terrorism"
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. This followed a series of bloody attacks on the Paris metro in the summer of 1995, including an attack on the Saint Michel station. In the text adopted in 1996, deprivation could only take place provided the person concerned had been convicted no later than 10 years after having acquired French citizenship. Another time period of maximum ten years could lapse between the facts and the deprivation.
Under Article 25, deprivation is a decision taken by the government 22 . In practice, the Minister of interior will first inform the person concerned of its intention to seek deprivation. This will make it possible for the individual to react and present its arguments. The Council of Ministers will take a decision on the deprivation after reviewing the arguments presented by the individual. The Council of State is in any case requested to provide its advice on the matter.
This provision was adapted in 1998, in order to limit its application to individuals possessing another nationality than the French one This provision was infrequently applied. Since 1996, only a handful of dual nationals were deprived of their French citizenship following convictions for terrorist acts 27 . In one of the cases, the deprivation was challenged before the Conseil d'Etat, the highest administrative court : the person concerned who was born in Algeria and had become French in 1998 thanks to his marriage to a French citizen, argued that the deprivation would make it possible to deport him, which would make it impossible for him to stay with his wife and children. Recently, the French government has announced its intention to revise the deprivation mechanism and extend it to new categories of citizens. In an official intervention before both Chambers of Parliament, the French president has indicated that deprivation of citizenship should be allowed 22 . This would require that the French Constitution be modified. It is unclear at this stage whether this will become reality.
Preliminary findings
The preceding overview has shown that deprivation of citizenship linked to terrorist activities has been possible in France and Belgium for some time. In both countries, this mechanism is rarely applied : only in a handful of cases has somebody been deprived of his nationality due to terrorist activities. When it is used, deprivation takes the form of an additional penalty : it may only be inflicted once a criminal conviction has been handed out. In other words, deprivation cannot be a substitute for a criminal trial. Nor may it be inflicted if no criminal conviction has been handed out. This is a good starting point when compared to other countries where the executive may deprive individuals of their nationality based on loosely defined reason of being "conducive to the public good" 33 .
In France and Belgium, deprivation is only in order if the individual concerned also possesses another nationality. It is, however, not relevant how effective that nationality is. It could therefore be that after the deprivation, the person finds itself possessing the nationality of a country he or she has no links with. This nationality could also be of very little value. In other words, deprivation proceeds on the assumption that both nationalities are equally valid and effective. This may be a fiction.
A striking difference between the two countries is that the decision making power is vested in different bodies. In Belgium, deprivation may only be ordered by a court. Until recently, the decision was even within the exclusive province of the Court of Appeal. Under French law, it is up to the government to take a decision on deprivation. While recourse is possible before a court to challenge a deprivation decision, the initial decision.
Notwithstanding this clear difference, deprivation remains a discretionary decision in both countries. Deprivation does not operate ex lege, upon certain requirements being met. A decision is necessary. Under French and Belgian law, the authority in charge must decide whether deprivation is in order in light of the specific circumstances of the case 34 . It is therefore not excluded that no deprivation will be ordered in case of conviction for a 'lighter' offense -such as providing logistical assistance to other directly involved in terrorist activities.
Another difference between the two legal systems relates to the effectiveness of the deprivation : while in Belgium, deprivation only becomes effective after exhaustion of all remedies and once the decision has been duly recorded in the register, a "décret" adopted by the French government has effect from the day it is signed. It may hence produce its effects even before being published. There is a caveat to this : under Belgian law, deprivation may be ordered even if this would lead to statelessness, when it appears that Belgian nationality was acquired fraudulently. In that case, in order to be compliant with the Rottmann ruling, Article 23/2 provides that the court should offer the person concerned a reasonable time period in order to attempt to recover his original nationality. It is only after this period has lapsed that the deprivation may be ordered.
As already underlined, a question remains open : whether deprivation is an effective tool against terrorism. The jury is still out on this question. As Hailbronner has argued, "Whether there is a practical value in revocation of citizenship for citizens engaged in international terrorism in addition to criminal and administrative sanctions is within the framework of law a matter of political expediency which may well lead to different results in different countries"
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. At the end of the day, it remains unclear what purpose is served by the banishment from the national community 36 . Certainly, if the purpose is to inflict a symbolic punishment, it may be questioned whether this makes any sense 37 . It is more likely that deprivation is seen as a means to prevent the terrorists from traveling and entering the country. As is well known, it is notoriously difficult to prevent a national from entering its own country. This is much easier to to when the person has been stripped of its nationality. . Even though much will depend on the way deprivation is organized 46 , international law permits a State to withdraw its nationality in case a person is convicted of terrorist crimes 47 . However, questions may be raised by the limited scope of application of the deprivation.
In order to answer these questions, a brief overview of the principle of equality in nationality law will first be offered (3.1.). In a second stage, the French and Belgian rules will be critically examined (3.2).
The principle of equality in nationality law
The prohibition of discrimination is one of the most firmly entrenched principle of the international law of human rights. The relationship between this principle and nationality may be obscured by the fact that very often, the focus is on discrimination on the basis of nationality 48 . The equality principle may, however, resonate very differently when combined with nationality : one may first wonder whether a State may link access to and loss of its nationality to elements which generally fall under the prohibition, such as sex, race or ethnic origin. Further, one may also inquire whether a State may distinguish between different types of nationals.
The first dimension can be easily caught by general prohibitions of discrimination. Even though the right to obtain a nationality and to keep it, is not (yet?) firmly protected under international law . Recently, the principle of equality was also extended to issues of nationality in relation to State successions 55 . The application of the prohibition of discrimination does not prevent a State from distinguishing between various categories, for example by granting speedier access to naturalisation to those who have been present for a long time on the territory of a State or selecting naturalisation criteria such as knowledge of the national language, deemed to reflect closer affinity with a State
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. The difference of treatment is then objectively justified by reference to the aim pursued by the State.
Against this background it will not be surprising to read that courts have long ago started to take stock of the principle of equality in nationality matters. As early as 1974 the German Constitutional court held that it was inadmissible to distinguish between father and mother for the transmission of citizenship 09. According to the Court, "the applicant was in an analogous situation to other children with a father of Maltese nationality and a mother of foreign nationality. The only distinguishing factor, which rendered him ineligible to acquire citizenship, was the fact that he had been born out of wedlock." (at  § 45) . See G.-R. DE GROOT and O. VONK, "Nationality, Statelessness and discrimination prohibition can only be invoked if a situation is within the ambit of a Convention right, is therefore not an obstacle to the application of the equality principle in nationality matters 62 .
There appears to be much less court activity in relation to loss and deprivation of nationality in the light of the prohibition of discrimination. However, one may safely state that it would be very difficult for a State to justify grounds of loss or deprivation exclusively predicated on the basis of the race, ethnicity or sex of the individuals concerned. It is enough in this respect to refer to Article 9 of the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which provides that a "Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds".
Much less can, however, be said about the possibility for a State to make distinctions among its citizens. In a not so distant past, it was not unusual for a State to reserve a better treatment to some categories of citizens. In most cases, newly naturalized citizens were subject to certain restrictions, for example in relation to the benefit and exercise of political rights 63 . These distinctions have now for the most part disappeared. In certain contexts, States continue, however, to distinguish between various categories of citizens. This is mainly the case in relation to deprivation of citizenship.
In that respect, one may refer to Article 5(2) of the European Convention on Nationality which provides that « Each State Party shall be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired its nationality subsequently » 64 .
The wording of this provision indicates that it does not have the same strength and force as other provisions of the Convention. This seems to be confirmed by the Explanatory Report, which indicated that Article 5(2) is « a declaration of intent and not a mandatory rule to be followed in all cases » 65 . If this paragraph is aimed at « eliminating the discriminatory application of rules in matters of nationality between nationals at birth and other nationals, including naturalised persons »
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, it does so with less force 67 . It has been argued, however, that the wording of Article 5(2) is deceptive as it stems from a wrong understanding of the prohibition of discrimination. The drafters of this provision did not mean to downplay the importance of non-discrimination, but to make it possible for a State to retain a distinction between different categories of citizens provided such distinction had a reasonable and objective justification 68 . In any case, it is clear that Article 5(2) may be applied to differences of treatment among citizens in relation to deprivation of citizenship. In fact Article 5(2) was initially drafted with precisely this issue in mind 69 . ECHR It is against this background that one should examine whether the French and Belgian provisions limiting deprivation to certain categories of nationals may be criticized.
The principle of equality and deprivation of citizenship
As has been indicated, the current regime in France and Belgium in relation to deprivation of nationality is only applicable to certain categories of citizens. This is not the only distinction made in relation to deprivation. The law of deprivation is in fact replete with distinctions
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. One should indeed bear in mind that deprivation may only be used if the person concerned possesses more than one nationality. Individuals possessing only one nationality may in other words not be subject to deprivation on grounds of terrorism, as this would lead to statelessness. This distinction may be questionable. Subjecting a dual citizen to an additional sanction which may not be inflicted upon the sole national, who will only be subject to criminal sanctions, means that people engaged in the same, reprehensible conduct, will not suffer the same fate 71 .
The distinction is even more questionable since some dual nationals may not be able to give up one of their nationalities. It is well known that, while on paper it is possible to renounce Moroccan nationality 72 , in reality such renunciation stands very little chance of being accepted 73 . Hence, dual nationals may not be in the same position vis-a-vis deprivation : a dual national who may easily renounce one of his nationalities, may escape deprivation affecting his other nationality. This is important given that not every nationality entitles to the same rights, in particular from the perspective of migration and freedom to travel. This argument goes hand in hand with the idea that dual nationals may not have the same bond with each one of their nationalities. Take a person born in Belgium, whose father possessed the Moroccan nationality and mother the Belgian nationality. The child will grow up in Belgium, enjoying at least on paper both Belgian and Moroccan citizenship. By all accounts, however, the child's most effective nationality will be the Belgian one. The Moroccan nationality will remain in the background. Depriving this person of his Belgian nationality would mean taking away his most effective nationality, leaving him with the citizenship of a country with which he may not have any substantial link. It may be questioned whether this may not come very close to leave a person stateless 74 . Going further, one may even wonder whether deprivation, as it is conceived in France and in Belgium, is not meant to affect more substantially, or even exclusively, citizens of a certain ethnic ascent. This would be only an indirect discrimination, as the relevant legal rules do not make any reference to the ethnic origin of the persons targeted by the deprivation. It is true that de facto, the vast majority of persons born French or Belgian citizens would usually be of French or Belgian ethnic origin, whatever that may mean, while persons who acquired French or Belgian citizenship at 70 This is in particular the case for the law in Belgium, which distinguishes between three scenarios which may lead to deprivation, each one of them with different features. 71 Article 17 of the ECN provides that dual nationals should have as the "same rights and duties as other nationals" of the State of which they are citizens. In Tanase, the Court referred to this provision to conclude that excluding dual nationals from the possibility of being elected memers of Parliament amounted to a discrimination (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 27 April 2010, Tanase v. Moldova, Application N° 7/08, § 177). Arguably, subjecting dual nationals to a penalty which may not be inflicted to those possessing only one nationality comes very close to depriving dual national of a certain right. While these questions may be highly relevant, the remainder of this paper will focus on the more straightforward distinction made under French and Belgian law between nationals by birth and nationals by conferral. A series of questions must be addressed in order to review the legitimacy the distinction between these two categories.
A first question pertains to the existence of comparable categories. If only certain categories of citizens are subject to deprivation nationality, it must be inquired whether these categories are comparable with those who are protected against such deprivation 76 . In that respect, it is striking to note that the French Constitutional Court (Conseil constitutionnel) has ruled twice that the various categories of citizens involved in deprivation, i.e. the citizens subject to and those protected against deprivation of citizenship, could be compared. In a first decision, the Court was asked to rule on various constitutional issues arising in connection with the 1996 Act which had made it possible to deprive citizens of their nationality if convicted for terrorist crimes , it is submitted that both courts should have adopted a more nuanced reasoning. It is undeniable that a difference exists between those who have become citizens at birth, because of the parental link with citizens, and those who have acquired it at a later stage on the basis of an application. Those differences may be relevant from the point of view of deprivation. However, the differences may obscure the fact that citizens in the two categories may have a strong bond with the State concerned and hence be in an analogous, or relevantly similar situation.
Going beyond the distinction between nationality acquired at birth and by conferral, one should therefore look at the situation from the perspective of the ties or links between an individual and the country of its citizenship. On average, a person who has acquired the nationality at birth, will have very strong ties with the country of citizenship. This may, however, be different if that person was born and has always lived abroad. Let us take the situation of a French couple living in Argentina : their son, born in Argentina, will acquire French citizenship at birth 
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: if this person grew up and went to school in France, should it not be accepted that he presents very strong ties with France? 86 Hence the distinction between nationality acquired at birth and nationality by conferral is by far too rigid and abstract 87 . Instead of focusing on the method of acquisition, one should rather examine the nature of the link between an individual and the State. It is true that the ECtHR has accepted that there are "in general persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to those whose link with a country stems from birth within it" 88 . In that case, however, the difference of treatment related to the question whether a person was born in a country and not so much to the question whether a person possessed a given nationality at birth. The Court in fact emphasized that the special treatment could be afforded to those born in a country and having built links with this country since then, without singling out those who have acquired a given citizenship at birth. This was central to the reasoning, much more than the method of acquisition of a given citizenship 89 . In other words, the method of acquisition of citizenship is not relevant : what matters is the strength of the ties between an individual and the State. The Court has reaffirmed this in the recent Biao case : when considering the Danish rule which reserved a special treatment to those who had been resident in Denmark for more the 28 y., because this meant that they presented a strong link with DK, the Court rephrased its holding in the Abdulaziz ruling by noting that "there are in general persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to those who have strong ties with a country, whether stemming from birth within it or from being a national or a long-term resident"
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. This clearly indicates that the Court does not attach much weight to the question how one may be linked to a country, but is rather interested in the strength of those ties 91 .
If one focuses on Belgium, this calls into question the application of the deprivation to a number of categories. This is manifest when considering that deprivation based on terrorism may be applied to persons who became Belgian citizens by declaration based on Article 12bis, § 1-1° of the Code. This provision makes it possible for persons born in Belgium to register as citizen when becoming 18 provided they have lived all their life in Belgium. True, these persons only obtained citizenship at the age of 18 or later, while persons born Belgian citizen have always enjoyed this citizenship 92 . However, this cannot hide the fact that the former were born and must have resided all their life in Belgium. From the perspective of substantial link between a citizen and a State, the difference between the two categories is therefore not relevant 93 . Instead of focusing on the method and timing of acquisition, one should therefore take into account other factors which may result in the establishment of close and enduring connections between a person and a country 94 .
Applying this test, one may also call into question the application of deprivation to persons who have become citizens on the ground of Article 11 § 2 CBN. This category covers persons born in Belgium, whose parents have been residing for at least ten years in Belgium when applying for the child to obtain Belgian citizenship occur at birth or at a later stage but at the latest when the child turns 12 y. However, such acquisition is only possible provided that the two parents have resided at least 10 y. in Belgium before filing the application requesting Belgian citizenship for their child 96 . Given that the deprivation may only occur once the person concerned reaches the age of 18 y., it will touch a person born and having lived all his life in Belgium. It is submitted that if one leaves the intricacies of Belgian citizenship law aside, the persons concerned are in a comparable situation, from a nationality perspective, with those having obtained citizenship at birth. This holds even more for those who have obtained Belgian citizenship based on Article 11 § 1 CNB. This provision gives effect to the double ius soli principle. It makes it possible for those children born in Belgium to obtain Belgian citizenship at birth when at least one of the parents was himself born in Belgium
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. From the perspective of the genuine connection, these citizens enjoy a very strong link with Belgium
98
. If one accepts that formal categories and methods of acquisition of citizenship are not relevant, one should therefore conclude that this category can by all means be compared with that of persons having obtained Belgian citizenship at birth from a Belgian parent 99 .
In sum, the use of broad categories linked to the method and timing of acquisition is flawed. It does not allow to take into account the life stories of citizens and the nature of the bond which they may have build with their country of citizenship. This approach falls short of the commonly accepted standard of discrimination law, which requires that comparable situations should be treated in the same way. It would be more appropriate to build a new distinction based on the actual (and not presumed) strength of a person's ties with a country. This would allow to apply a different treatment to the category showing a rather weak bond with the state whose citizenship is at stake.
If different categories of citizens may be distinguished depending on the strength of the ties between an individual and a State, one should next inquire whether there is any legitimate aim to make such a distinction 100 . Indeed, a differentiation of treatment will not constitute discrimination "if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a 196/1985 (1989) , at § 9.4, finding that the differentation by reference to the nationality falls "within the reference to 'other status' in the second sentence of Article 26"). The distinction discussed in this paper is not based on the nationality of the person concerned : it divides the group of nationals in two distinct categories. purpose which is legitimate" 101 . Hence, proportionate measures which are designed to achieve a legitimate objective may not be criticized.
In that respect, the first step is to identify the objective pursued by the States concerned. Arguably, citizenship deprivation is used by States as a counter-terrorism tool. As the government explained in Belgium, the objective of the measure is to "lutter plus efficacement contre le terrorisme" 102 . There is little difficulty in accepting that a State may adopt specific measures to fight terrorism. Courts have made it clear that this is a legitimate aim, and one for which they will not easily second-guess the executive or the legislative branch 103 . The Conseil constitutionnel expressly referred to the particular nature of terrorist crimes to accept that the deprivation pursued a legitimate aim 104 .
It is striking, however, that the link between deprivation and counter-terrorism is seldom explained. In particular one may wonder how depriving some individuals of their citizenship will enhance the protection of the population at large against terrorist attacks. The most reasonable explanation for the insistence by various governments to resort to citizenship deprivation, is that it allows the executive to deport the individuals concerned more easily 105 . Stripped from their French or Belgian citizenship, the persons convicted of terrorist acts may indeed be prevented from returning to their home country and, if they succeed in doing so, expelled to third countries.
One may have some doubts about the effectiveness of this counter-terrorism tool. If terrorists indeed do intend to kill and maim in the name of an absolute faith, is there any reason to fear that they will be discouraged or prevented from doing so because they have lost their French and Belgian nationality? It is submitted that this legitimate question is not one for the courts to answer. Courts should indeed in this matter defer to the executive. If one takes stock of the fact that the measure examined touch upon two matters for which governments enjoy a large margin of discretion (i.e. terrorism 106 and citizenship), it is easy to accept that courts will apply a highly deferential test to the government's purported justification for the unequal treatment. The badge of differentiation 107 used by the French and Belgian legislators, i.e. the method of acquisition of citizenship, does not appear to command strict scrutiny persons in analogous situations is likely to trigger a finding of violation of the general prohibition of discrimination. The Belgian constitutional court alluded to this in its 2009 ruling, when it noted that "Onder voorbehoud van een kennelijk onredelijke beoordeling, behoort het tot de beoordelingsbevoegdheid van de wetgever te beslissen welke categorieën van Belgen het voorwerp van een maatregel tot vervallenverklaring kunnen uitmaken en welke categorieën van die mogelijkheid moeten worden uitgesloten" 109 .
It remains necessary, however, to verify whether unequal treatment was proportionate, i.e. it is necessary to weigh the objective of the differentiated treatment with the gravity of the unequal situation that has been created. There is indeed a need to ensure that there is an "objective and reasonable justification" for the difference of treatment 110 . This requires examining whether there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized 111 .
The French and Belgian experience are most interesting in that respect. In both countries, the constitutional courts paid close attention to the procedural limitations constraining deprivation of citizenship, to conclude that the measures were not unreasonable. The French Constitutional Council noted that deprivation was only possible within a certain time limit after the person concerned has obtained French citizenship. In 2009, this time limit was put at 10 years 112 . In its 2015 ruling, the same council noted that the French legislator had extended the time limit, making it possible to deprive somebody of its nationality up to 15 years after acquisition. The Council indicated that this time limit "could not further be extended without unreasonably breaching the equality between persons who are born French and persons who become French" 113 . For its part, the Belgian Constitutional Court noted that the deprivation was an exceptional measure, which may only be ordered by a court in case of serious violation of fundamental duties. This was enough, according to the Court, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the measure 114 . One may in that respect also refer to the ruling of the ECJ in the Rottmann case : looking at the possibility that Mr Rottmann could lose his German citizenship, the ECJ stressed the importance of the "lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the withdrawal decision" 115 .
In view of these rulings, questions may be asked in relation to the current regime of deprivation for terrorism under Belgian law. As explained, according to Article 23/2, deprivation may be ordered without any regard to the time which has lapsed since the person concerned has acquired Belgian citizenship. This is highly questionable from the perspective of proportionality. The lack of reasonableness is even more visible for those who became Belgian citizens at birth and could nonetheless be subject to deprivation 116 . Even taking into account the specific nature of terrorist acts, it may be doubted whether there is a reasonable relation of proportionality between the possibility to deprive somebody of his citizenship without any consideration of the length of time since the person acquired citizenship and the objective pursued by the State. One may recall in this respect that a person who became Belgian (or French citizen) at birth on the basis of ius sanguinis, may never be subject to deprivation 117 . In practice, a person who has enjoyed Belgian citizenship for thirty years, having acquired it at the age of 18, is therefore susceptible to be deprived of it even though a person who acquired Belgian citizenship at birth ius sanguinis and has only enjoyed it for 18 years, may not be subject to deprivation.
In this respect one may recall that in Biao, the European Court of Human Rights held that it was not convinced "that in general it can be concluded that the strength of one's ties continuously and significantly increases after, for example, 10, 15 or 20 years in a country"
118
. The Court made this remark in relation to a Danish provision whereby the benefit of a special family reunification regime was reserved for those who had held Danish citizenship for at least twenty eight years. However, the Court's finding that "to conclude that in order to be presumed to have strong ties with a country, one has to have direct ties with that country for at least 28 years appears excessively strict" may resonate in other contexts. Indeed, the Court's finding is relevant every time a State creates a distinction between different categories of its citizens. The current deprivation regime under Belgian law goes in fact much further than the Danish provision challenged in Biao, as it makes no allowance at all for those who have built strong ties with Belgium over the course of a long period. If a person has obtained its citizenship otherwise than ius sanguinis or by operation of the double ius soli principle, no protection may be found against deprivation no matter how long one has been a Belgian citizen. Clearly, the lack of any time limit preventing deprivation for those who have held Belgian citizenship for a long time is a matter for strong concern under the equality principle.
Another aspect which needs to be examined in light of the principle of proportionality is that of the gravity of the offense 119 . At present, deprivation is in order for all terrorist offenses under Belgian law 120 . Certainly, States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in defining which acts qualify as terrorist offenses. The difficulty is that this list of offenses has grown substantially over recent years. Next to very grave crimes such as murder, kidnapping or highjacking of an airplane, one may also fall under the heading of terrorist act when one is found guilty of having provided information, logistical support or financial assistance to a terrorist group 121 . The same applies for persons who receive training, whether in Belgium or abroad, in order to build weapons which may be used to commit terrorist crimes. Finally, it has been made a criminal offense for a person to leave or enter Belgium for the purpose of participating in the activity of a terrorist group 122 .
Let there be no doubt that it may be perfectly justified from a counter-terrorism perspective to resort to criminal sanctions in all these cases. However, taking into account that such action may be criminally prosecuted, it may be questioned whether the additional penalty of deprivation, which may not be inflicted to those terrorists who only have one nationality or whose Belgian nationality was gained at birth ius sanguinis, still bears a reasonable relationship of proportionality with the aim pursued by the legislator. It is submitted that account should be taken of the exact nature of the crime committed by the person concerned when deciding upon the deprivation. It is difficult to accept that a person who received Belgian citizenship at birth 123 , and is later arrested when leaving Belgium because of suspicion that he is about to be involved in terrorist crimes, could be found guilty of a terrorist crime and hence be deprived of his citizenship while a person born abroad, but in possession of Belgian citizenship at birth ius sanguinis, could not be subject to the same penalty even if that person has been involved in actual killing and torturing other in name of some radical beliefs. In other words, the combination of the broad brush approach adopted in criminal law, whatever its merits and legitimacy, with the extension of the possibility to deprive somebody of his citizenship, may create a risk of unintended spillover which unduly restricts the right to equal treatment.
By way of conclusion
When looking at French and Belgian policy and practice regarding deprivation for terrorist acts, one cannot but note the limited scope of deprivation. This measure, which is considered to be an additional penalty, it not uniformly applied to all nationals. It can only be inflicted upon certain categories of citizens. Persons who acquired French or Belgian nationality at birth following transmission by one parent are protected against such deprivation, even though they may possess another nationality. This distinction, which goes back to the early days of deprivation in those two countries, has been criticized for a long time. Niboyet wrote in 1947 that:
"Dès l'instant où elle [deprivation] frappe les individus nés en France et devenus français au cours de leur majorité, on ne comprend pas pourquoi seuls les Français d'origine lui échappent. Il n'est pas plus permis d'être un indésirable dans un cas que dans l'autre, et cela manque totalement d'élégance, après avoir accordé la nationalité, de la retirer pour des faits que peuvent impunément commentre les Français d'origine. Cette discrimination ne se défend pas" 124 .
Certainly, the distinction creates a "second-class citizenship" 125 , which is difficult to reconcile, in some respects, with the prohibition of discrimination. The distinction also smacks of an ethnic approach to nationality. While the regime put forward by both the French and the Belgian legislators is prima facie neutral as it focuses on the method of citizenship acquisition, it does have a stronger adverse impact on categories of people whose origin lies outside Europe. This may even reinforce existing patterns of social stereotyping related to one or other "natural feature"
126
. Treating a class of citizens with suspicion because of their alleged lack of strong ties due to the way they obtained citizenship, regardless of whether they are longstanding citizens, is unacceptable.
Two solutions may be contemplated : one could either extend deprivation to all nationals, no matter how one acquired or obtained citizenship 127 . In this context, the method of acquisition could still play a role, albeit limited. Acquisition of citizenship at birth ius sanguinis would no longer offer an absolute protection against deprivation. It could, however, be taken into account when deciding whether deprivation is proportionate in view of all circumstances of the case. This would mean that a person having obtained French or Belgian citizenship as an adult could be subject to deprivation more easily than a person who became a citizen as a child, although the method of acquisition would not be given as much weight as the length of time one has been a citizen. This case by case approach would do more justice to the very nature of citizenship as a bond between an individual and a State having at its basis a social fact of attachment. Failing such extension of deprivation, which would bring French and Belgian law in line with the practice of other States, there is a risk that the application of the current deprivation regimes to some citizens could breach the prohibition of discrimination 128 . Courts should therefore take into account the demands of the equality principle when ruling upon individual deprivation cases. This will not be easy, as this requires drawing comparisons between various categories of citizens and possibly also second-guessing the executive's motives for seeking deprivation. This is, however, the price to be paid if one intends to keep the practice of deprivation in line of contemporary standards of equality of treatment.
